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Abstract
While finite-variable fragments of the propositional modal logic S5—comp-
lete with respect to reflexive, symmetric, and transitive frames—are polynomial-
time decidable, the restriction to finite-variable formulas for logics of reflexive
and transitive frames yields fragments that remain “intractable.” The role
of the symmetry condition in this context has not been investigated. We
show that symmetry either by itself or in combination with reflexivity pro-
duces logics that behave just like logics of reflexive and transitive frames, i.e.,
their finite-variable fragments remain intractable, namely PSPACE-hard. This
raises the question of where exactly the borderline lies between modal logics
whose finite-variable fragments are tractable and the rest.
Keywords: propositional modal logic, symmetric frames, finite-variable frag-
ments, computational complexity
1 Introduction
While the propositional modal logic S5, which has Kripke-style semantics in terms
of reflexive, transitive, and symmetric frames, is “computationally intractable”—
namely, its satisfiability problem is NP-complete—its n-variable fragments, for every
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n ∈ N, are polynomial-time decidable. In contrast, as originally shown in [5] and
further elaborated in [2] (see also [7] and [13]), most “natural” modal logics whose
Kripke frames are reflexive, transitive, or both, remain intractable even if the number
of propositional variables in their languages is restricted to one (for all logics in the
intervals [K, GL] and [K, Grz]) or zero (for all logics in the interval [K, K4]). It
is, thus, interesting to see if symmetry plays any role in making S5 stand apart from
other propositional modal logics in this regard. More generally, does the addition of
the axiom of symmetry to a logic make its finite-variable fragments easier to decide
than the entire logic? The role of symmetry in this context has not been investigated
in the literature.
In this paper, we answer this question in the negative by showing that all logics
in the interval [K, KTB], where KTB is the propositional modal logic of reflex-
ive and symmetric frames, have PSPACE-hard single-variable fragments. As a by-
product, we prove that logics KTB and KB, which is the propositional modal logic
of symmetric frames, can be embedded into their single-variable fragments, which
are, thus, as semantically expressive—from the point of view of validity and (local)
satisfiability—as the entire logics.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we briefly recall the syntax and
semantics of the logics we consider in the present paper and establish that all the
logics in the interval [K, KTB] are PSPACE-hard. Then, in section 3, we present
our main results concerning single-variable fragments of logics in [K, KTB]. We
conclude in section 4.
2 Preliminaries
The propositional modal language contains countably many propositional variables
p1, p2, . . ., the Boolean constant ⊥ (“falsehood”), the Boolean connective →, and the
modal connective ✷. Other connectives, as well as formulas, are defined as usual.
We also use the following abbreviations:
✷
0ϕ = ϕ, ✷60ϕ = ϕ,
✷
n+1ϕ = ✷✷nϕ, ✷6n+1ϕ = ✷6nϕ ∧ ✷n+1ϕ,
✷
+ϕ = ϕ ∧ ✷ϕ, ✸nϕ = ¬✷n¬ϕ.
A (Kripke) frame is a pair F = 〈W,R〉, where W is a non-empty set (of worlds) and
R is a binary (accessibility) relation on W . A (Kripke) model is a pair M = 〈F, V 〉,
where F is a frame and V is a valuation function assigning to every propositional
variable a subset of W ; if M has the form 〈F, V 〉, we say that it is based on F.
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The satisfaction relation between models M, worlds w, and formulas ϕ is defined as
follows:
• M, w |= pi ⇌ w ∈ V (pi);
• M, w |= ⊥ never holds;
• M, w |= ϕ1 → ϕ2 ⇌ M, w |= ϕ1 implies M, w |= ϕ2;
• M, w |= ✷ϕ1 ⇌ M, w
′ |= ϕ1 whenever wRw
′.
Let C be a class of frames. A formula is valid on C if it is satisfied at every world of
every model based on a frame from C. A formula is satisfiable in C if it is satisfied
at some world of some model based on a frame from C.
A propositional modal logic is a set of formulas containing all classical tautologies
as well as the formula ✷(p → q) → (✷p → ✷q) and closed under uniform substitu-
tion, modus ponens, and necessitation. Of particular interest to us are the logics K,
which is the set of formulas valid on all frames; KB, which is the set of formulas valid
on all frames whose accessibility relation is symmetric; and KTB, which is the set of
formulas valid on all frames whose accessibility relation is reflexive and symmetric.
More generally, we will be concerned with the interval [K, KTB] of logics L such
that K ⊆ L ⊆ KTB. This interval contains a number of logics that have been,
for various reasons, of interest to logicians; examples include T, which is the set of
formulas valid on reflexive frames; KB; KDB, which is the set of formulas valid on
symmetric and serial frames; and Hughes’s logic [8]. If a logic L is Kripke-complete,
i.e., coincides with the set of formulas valid on some class C of frames, we say that
a formula ϕ is L-satisfiable if ϕ is satisfiable in C.
We say that a logic is PSPACE-hard (PSPACE-complete) if the problem of mem-
bership in it is PSPACE-hard (PSPACE-complete); analogously for fragments of log-
ics. In what follows, we rely on the statement as well as the proof of the following:
Theorem 2.1 Let L be a logic such that K ⊆ L ⊆ KTB. Then, L is PSPACE-hard.
Proof. The proof is a slight modification of Ladner’s proof for logics between K and
S4 (Theorem 3.1 in [9]; see also [1], Section 6.7), which proceeds by reduction from
the set TQBF of true quantified Boolean formulas, known to be PSPACE-hard [12].
Note that as PSPACE is closed under complementation, the complement of TQBF
is also PSPACE-hard. Since every quantified Boolean formula can be polynomially
reduced to one in the prenex normal form, we may assume without a loss of generality
that both TQBF and its complement only contain formulas in the prenex normal
form.
3
First, we define a polynomial-time computable translation f from the set of quan-
tified Boolean formulas in the prenex normal form to the set of modal formulas such
that
• if θ ∈ TQBF, then f(θ) is KTB-satisfiable;
• if θ /∈ TQBF, then f(θ) is not K-satisfiable.
Let θ = Q1p1 . . .Qm pm ϕ(p1, . . . , pm), where Q1, . . . ,Qm ∈ {∃, ∀} and ϕ(p1, . . . , pm) is
a propositional formula containing no variables other than p1, . . . , pn. Let q0, q1, . . . , qm
be propositional variables not in θ. Then, f(θ) is a conjunction of the following for-
mulas:
• q0;
• ✷6m
m∧
i=0
(qi →
∧
j 6=i
¬qj);
• ✷6m−1
∧
{i :Qi=∃}
(qi−1 → ✸qi);
• ✷6m−1
∧
{i :Qi=∀}
(qi−1 → ✸(qi ∧ pi) ∧✸(qi ∧ ¬pi));
• ✷6m−1
m−1∧
i=1
(qi →
∧
j6i
(pj → ✷(qi+1 → pj)) ∧
∧
j6i
(¬pj → ✷(qi+1 → ¬pj)));
• ✷m(qm → ϕ).
Note that only the second-to-last formula is substantively different from the formulas
used in [9]. Suppose that θ is true, and thus, there exists a quantifier tree T witnessing
its truth. We use T to define a KTB-model satisfying f(θ). Let W be the set of
nodes of T and R be the symmetric and reflexive closure of the “daughter-of” relation
of T . Thus, 〈W,R〉 is a KTB-frame. It remains to define the valuation. Let qi be
true precisely at the nodes of level i (where the root is a node of level 0), let pi be
true at a node of level j > i if, and only if, the substitution of truth values for a
variable of θ connected to that node, or to the node of level i on the same branch
of T , returns “true” for pi, and let pi be false at all nodes of levels j < i. It is then
straightforward to check that f(θ) is satisfied at the root of T . That falsehood of θ
implies that f(θ) is not K-satisfiable is argued exactly as in Ladner’s proof [9].
Now, let L be a logic such that K ⊆ L ⊆ KTB. If θ /∈ TQBF, then ¬f(θ) ∈ K
and, hence, ¬f(θ) ∈ L. Conversely, if θ ∈ TQBF, then ¬f(θ) /∈ KTB and, hence,
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¬f(θ) /∈ L. Thus, the translation t(θ) = ¬f(θ) reduces the complement of TQBF,
which is PSPACE-hard, to L. Therefore, L is PSPACE-hard. ✷
As there exist polynomial-space algorithms for deciding satisfiability, and thus
validity, forKB,KDB, andKTB (see, e.g., [4]), these logics are PSPACE-complete.
3 Complexity of finite-variable fragments
We now show, using a suitable modification of Halpern’s technique [5] (see also [11]),
that single-variable fragments of all logics in the interval [K, KTB] are PSPACE-
hard. In the course of the proof we establish that logics KB and KTB can be
effectively embedded into their single-variable fragments.
Let ϕ be an arbitrary modal formula. Assume that ϕ only contains propositional
variables p1, . . . , pn. First, recursively define the translation ·
′ as follows:
pi
′ = pi, where i ∈ {1, . . . , n};
⊥′ = ⊥;
(φ→ ψ)′ = φ′ → ψ′;
(✷φ)′ = ✷(pn+1 → φ
′).
Second, put
ϕ̂ = pn+1 ∧ ϕ
′.
Notice that ϕ is equivalent to ϕ̂(pn+1/⊤) in K and, hence, in KTB.
Lemma 3.1 Let L ∈ {K,KTB}. If ϕ̂ is L-satisfiable, then it is satisfiable in a
model based on a frame for L where pn+1 is true at every world.
Proof. Suppose that M, w0 |= ϕ̂ for some model M and some world w0. Consider
the submodel M′ of M that consists of worlds where pn+1 is true. As M, w0 |= pn+1,
the set of worlds of M′ is non-empty. It is straightforward to check both that M′ is
based on a frame for L and that M′, w0 |= ϕ̂. ✷
Lemma 3.2 Let L ∈ {K,KTB}. Then, ϕ is L-satisfiable if, and only if, ϕ̂ is
L-satisfiable.
Proof. Suppose that M, w0 |= ϕ. To obtain a model satisfying ϕ̂, make pn+1 true
at every world of M. Conversely, suppose that M, w0 |= ϕ̂. In view of Lemma 3.1,
we may assume that pn+1 is universally true in M. As ϕ is equivalent to ϕ̂(pn+1/⊤),
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Figure 1: Model Mk
it follows that M, w0 |= ϕ. ✷
Now, consider the following class M of finite models. For every k ∈ {1, . . . , n+1},
the class M contains a model Mk, depicted in Figure 1, that looks as follows. For
brevity, we call some worlds p-worlds; if a world is not a p-world, we call it a p¯-world.
The model Mk is a chain of worlds whose root, rk, is a p-world. The root is part
of a pattern of worlds, described below, which is succeeded by three final p-worlds.
The pattern looks as follows: a single p-world is followed by 2i + 1 p¯-worlds, for
1 6 i 6 k. Thus, the chain looks as follows: the root (a p-world), then three p¯-
worlds, then a p-world, then five p¯-worlds, then a p-world, . . . , then a p-world, then
2k+1 p¯-worlds, then three p-worlds. The accessibility relation Rk between the worlds
of Mk is both reflexive and symmetric. To complete the definition of Mk, we define
the propositional variable p to be true at exactly the p-worlds.
Before proceeding, we prove a lemma about the models in M. Given a model Mk,
denote by cki , for i ∈ {1, . . . , k}, the “middle” world of the chain of 2i + 1 p¯-worlds
preceded and succeeded by p-worlds; see Figure 1. Also, let
εi = ✷
6i¬p ∧✸i+1p, where i ∈ N.
Lemma 3.3 Let x be a world of Mk that lies between rk and c
k
i , for some i 6 k
(i.e., cki cannot be reached from rk by consecutive steps along Rk without passing
through x). Then, Mk, x |= εi if, and only if, x = c
k
i .
Proof. Straightforward. ✷
We now define formulas we use to simulate the propositional variables of ϕ̂. First,
inductively define, for every k ∈ {1, . . . , n+ 1}, the following sequence of formulas:
δ = ✷+p;
δkk = εk ∧✸
k+2δ;
δki = εi ∧✸
2i+3δki+1, where 1 6 i < k.
Next, let, for every k ∈ {1, . . . , n+ 1},
αk = p ∧✸
2δk1
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and
βk = ¬p ∧✸αk.
Let σ be a (substitution) function that, given a formula ψ, replaces all occurrences
of pi in ψ by βi, where 1 6 i 6 n+ 1. Finally, define
ϕ∗ = σ(ϕ̂)
to produce a single-variable formula ϕ∗.
Lemma 3.4 Let L ∈ {K,KTB}. Then, ϕ is L-satisfiable if, and only if, ϕ∗ is
L-satisfiable.
Proof. Suppose that ϕ is not L-satisfiable. Then, in view of Lemma 3.2, ϕ̂ is not
L-satisfiable; hence, ¬ϕ̂ ∈ L. Since L is closed under substitution, ¬ϕ∗ ∈ L, and so
ϕ∗ is not L-satisfiable.
Suppose that ϕ is L-satisfiable. Then, in view of Lemmas 3.1 and 3.2, M, w0 |= ϕ̂
for some M = 〈W,R, V 〉, such that 〈W,R〉 is a frame for L and pn+1 is true at every
w ∈ W , and for some w0 ∈ W . (Recall that ϕ̂ only contains variables p1, . . . , pn+1.)
Define model M′ as follows. Attach to M all the models from M; then, for every
x in M, put xR′rm and rmR
′x, where rm is the root of Mm ∈ M, exactly when
M, x |= pm. Notice that rn+1 is accessible in M
′ from every x ∈ W . Finally, make p
true at exactly those worlds of the attached models where it was true, and make it
false at every world in W . Notice that M′ is based on a frame for L.
To conclude the proof, it suffices to show that M′, w0 |= ϕ
∗. To that end, we first
prove two auxiliary Sublemmas:
Sublemma 3.5 Let x be a world of M′ that lies between the root rk of the attached
model Mk and the world c
k
i of Mk, for some i 6 k (i.e., c
k
i cannot be reached from rk
by consecutive steps along R′ without passing through x). Then, M′, x |= εi if, and
only if, x = cki .
Proof. Straightforward, using Lemma 3.3. ✷
Sublemma 3.6 Let x ∈ W and let M′, x |= ✸αk. Then, xR
′rk.
Proof. Since M′, x |= ✸αk, so xR
′y and M′, y |= αk, for some y in M
′. We show
that y = rk. Since M
′, y |= p, clearly y /∈ W , and thus y is the root rm of some
Mm. As M
′, y |= ✸2δk1 , we can reach from y in two R
′-steps a world y1 such that
M′, y1 |= ε1. Since wR
′rn+1 holds for every w ∈ W , and thus M
′, w 6|= ✷¬p for every
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w ∈ W , we know that y1 /∈ W , so y1 belongs to one of the attached models Mj. In
two R′-steps, we cannot go past cj1 for any j and can only reach c
j
1 if j = m; hence,
due to Sublemma 3.5, y1 = c
m
1 . Since M
′, cm1 |= ✸
5(ε2 ∧ δ
k
2 ), we can reach from c
m
1 in
five R′-steps a world y2 such that M
′, y2 |= ε2. As M
′, w 6|= ✷¬p for every w ∈ W ,
we know that y2 /∈ W . In five R
′-steps, we cannot go past cj2 for any j and can only
reach cj2 if j = m; hence, due to Sublemma 3.5, y2 = c
m
2 , and so M
′, cm2 |= ✸
7(ε3∧δ
k
3 ).
We can now repeat the argument without worrying about the possibility of satisfying
further formulas due to the presence in M′ of the worlds outside ofMm, as we cannot
step outside of Mm, starting from c
m
2 , in seven steps. By inductively repeating the
argument m times, we arrive at the world cmm such that M
′, cmm |= ✸
k+2δ, which can
only happen if m = k. Thus, all along we have been evaluating the formulas in Mk,
and thus y = rk, as required. ✷
Now, we proceed with the proof of the main Lemma.
Recall that ϕ∗ = σ(ϕ̂) = σ(pn+1 ∧ ϕ
′) = βn+1 ∧ σ(ϕ
′). It is easy to check that
M′, w0 |= βn+1. It then suffices to show thatM, x |= ψ
′ if, and only if, M′, x |= σ(ψ′),
for every subformula ψ of ϕ and every x ∈ W . This can be done by induction on ψ.
For the base case, assume that M′, x |= βi; in particular, M
′, x |= ✸αi. Then,
due to Sublemma 3.6, xR′ri, and therefore M, x |= pi by definition of M
′. The other
direction is straightforward. The Boolean cases are also straightforward.
Let ψ = ✷χ. Assume that M′, x 6|= ✷(βn+1 → σ(χ
′)). Then, xR′y, as well as
M′, y |= βn+1 and M
′, y 6|= σ(χ′), for some y in M′. In particular, M′, y |= ¬p; thus,
y cannot be the root of any of the attached models. Therefore, y ∈ W and the
inductive hypothesis is applicable; this gives us M, x 6|= ✷(pn+1 → χ
′), as desired.
The other direction is straightforward, using the converse of Sublemma 3.6. ✷
Given a formula ϕ, let
e(ϕ) = ¬((¬ϕ)∗).
Theorem 3.7 Let L ∈ {K,KTB}. Then, there exists a polynomial-time mapping
that embeds L into its single-variable fragment.
Proof. Take the mapping e defined above. ✷
Remark 3.8 Notice that Lemma 3.4 and Theorem 3.7 apply to the logic KB, as
well. We did not mention KB in their statements as this is not required for the
proof of our main result, Theorem 3.9.
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Theorem 3.9 Let L be a logic in the interval [K,KTB]. Then, the single-variable
fragment of L is PSPACE-hard.
Proof. We reduce the PSPACE-hard complement of the set TQBF of true quan-
tified Boolean formulas to the single-variable fragment of L. Let θ /∈ TQBF; then,
t(θ) ∈ K, where t is the translation defined in the proof of Theorem 2.1; hence, in
view of Theorem 3.7, e(t(θ)) ∈ K, and thus e(t(θ)) ∈ L. Let, on the other hand,
θ ∈ TQBF; then, as shown in the proof of Theorem 2.1, t(θ) /∈ KTB; hence, in
view of Theorem 3.7, e(t(θ)) /∈ KTB, and thus e(t(θ)) /∈ L. Thus, the polynomial-
time computable translation g(θ) = e(t(θ)) reduces the complement of TQBF to the
single-variable fragment of L; the statement of the Theorem follows. ✷
Theorem 3.9 implies that the single-variable fragments of all PSPACE-complete
logics in [K,KTB] are PSPACE-complete; in particular, we have the following:
Corollary 3.10 The single-variable fragments of T, KB, KDB, and KTB are
PSPACE-complete.
Note that the PSPACE-completeness of the single-variable fragment of T has been
established in [5].
4 Conclusion
We have shown that when it comes to their computational properties, the modal
logics of symmetric, as well as of reflexive and symmetric frames, behave in the same
way as the logics of transitive, as well as of reflexive and transitive, frames—they
remain intractable, namely, PSPACE-hard, when their languages are restricted to
only one propositional variable.
Adding the axiom of symmetry to the logic of reflexive and transitive frames, i.e.,
S4, is not the only way of arriving at S5,—it can also be obtained, inter alia, by
adding the axiom of Euclideanness, ¬✷p→ ✷¬✷p, to T. The role of Euclideanness is
well understood in the context of the present inquiry,—it has been shown in [10] that
every extension of the logic of Euclidean frames, K5, is locally tabular; therefore,
any finite-variable fragment of such a logic is polynomial-time decidable.
Thus, we have a good understanding of the role played by various properties of
Kripke frames of most interest to “traditional” logicians (reflexivity, seriality, sym-
metry, transitivity, and Euclideanness)—represented by logics included in the “cube
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T KTB
K4 KB5
S4 S5
KD KDB
KD4 KD45
K45
K5
KD5
Figure 2: Cube of modal logics
of modal logics” [3], see Figure 2—in the computational behaviour of the finite-
variable fragments of the corresponding logics: while Euclideanness—as well as sym-
metry combined with transitivity, which imply Euclideanness—make such fragments
“tractable”, reflexivity, symmetry, transitivity, and seriality by themselves—as well
as transitivity and symmetry combined either with reflexivity or seriality—do not
have this effect (seriality, along with reflexivity and transitivity, has been considered
in [2]).
This raises the more general question of where the borderline lies between, on
the one hand, logics that behave like those described in [5], [7], [13], [2], and in
this paper, i.e., whose finite-variable fragments remain intractable, and on the other,
those that behave like S5, i.e., whose finite-variable fragments are simpler than entire
logics (in all the cases known in the literature, this amounts to having polynomial-
time decidable finite-variable fragments). It is clear that the answer is not directly
linked to the complexity of the logic in question—as shown in [2], satisfiability for
single- and two-variable fragments of such logics as S4.3, GL.3, and Grz.3, whose
satisfiability problem is NP-complete, is also NP-complete. While the borderline
between the NP-hard and the PSPACE-hard in modal logic has received attention in
the literature (see, for example, [6]), this question has not, as far as we know, been
so far addressed.
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